The present invention relates generally to flight testing of high velocity interceptor missiles used in ground-based missile defense systems, and more particularly, to a novel method for realistic, real-time testing of high velocity interceptor missiles in a safe and accurate manner.
An important part of the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) is engagement of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats by the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI). FIG. 1 illustrates three ICBM threats to the U.S., and FIG. 2 more specifically depicts the first and second (if needed) intercepts of a Chinese ICBM aimed at Los Angeles. In accordance with the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union, GBI missiles will be restricted to a single ABM base at Grand Forks, N.D. Due to this restriction regarding the launch site of the missiles, the first intercept of any ICBM warhead, termed the "reentry vehicle (RV)", will occur at long distances from Grand Forks, and the relative velocity of the RV with respect to the GBI missile will be very high, i.e., about 10-14 km/sec. Second and third intercepts (if required to defeat an RV threat) could also have high relative closing velocities, e.g., about 8-11 km/sec.
A high relative closing velocity translates into a short time between acquisition of the RV by the on-board sensor of the GBI missile and the time of intercept. Since many GBI kill vehicle (KV) endgame functions must be performed in that short time, realistic real-time testing to validate the high velocity GBI in the endgame will become a formidable task when NMD and GBI full-up testing takes place in 1999 or shortly thereafter. These KV endgame functions include cluster acquisition, divert-to-cluster centroid, object resolution, track association, sensor-to-sensor object correlation, features and discriminants collection, object classification, RV designation, divert-to-RV centroid, aimpoint computation, smart aimpoint homing, and hit-to-kill.
Range safety is the biggest problem with respect to validation testing of the GBI high velocity KV endgame functions. There must be an extremely low probability that the GBI KV, the target (i.e. ICBM threat), or any intercept debris will impact on a land mass or continue into orbit around the earth. Since the United States must adhere to the 1972 ABM Treaty, ABM testing will be restricted to the treaty-designated test ranges, namely, Kwajalein and White Sands. The White Sands Test Range is totally unacceptable for many reasons. For example, the target velocity would be too high, the interceptor velocity would be too high, and the intercept regime would be outside the atmosphere, all of which would result in undesirable range safety consequences. The Kwajalein Test Range has been used for testing of ICBMs and for testing of medium relative velocity intercepts within the atmoshphere.
However, exoatmoshperic interception of a test threat complex launched from Vandenberg by a high velocity GBI KV launched from Kwajalein would create GBI KV and/or intercept debris that could go into orbit or impact on populated areas many thousands of miles away. The debris impact area would be extensive, spanning continents. Orbiting debris from the intercept would create significant hazards for functioning satellites in lower orbits, and life-threatening dangers for manned spacecraft and space stations. Thus, the overall result would be unacceptable range safety.
Based on the above and foregoing, there presently exists a need in the art for a safe and effective method for realistic, real-time testing of high velocity GBI missiles (KVs). The present invention fulfills this need in the art.